MEDIAEVAL and Renaissance rhetoricians and philosophers, following the example of Cicero, seldom omit from their treatment of rhetoric some consideration of the subject matter, nature, and end of the art. Long before Cicero rhetoric had become one of the focal points of the differences of philosophic schools, and the practice and application of the art had long wandered from field to field, reflecting, and sometimes even affecting, the complexities of philosophic discussions. Yet rhetoric is treated as a simple verbal discipline, in histories which touch upon it, as the art of speaking well, applied either as it was in Rome to forensic oratory and associated with the interpretation of laws or, more frequently, applied as it was in the Renaissance in the interpretation and use of the works of orators and poets, and associated with or even indistinguishable from poetic and literary criticism. The history of rhetoric as it has been written since the Renaissance is therefore in part the distressing record of the obtuseness of writers who failed to study the classics and to apply rhetoric to literature, and in part the monotonous enumeration of doctrines, or preferably sentences, repeated from Cicero or commentators on Cicero. Scholarly labors have reconstructed only a brief and equivocal history for rhetoric during the Middle Ages. The development consists of slight and unoriginal increments of erudition in the compendia composed from the fourth to the ninth century -which were derived largely from the De Inventione of Cicero and the Ad Herennium -and in later commentaries and treatises until in the twelfth century they reflect and use doctrines from Quintilian and from the later rhetorical works of Cicero, the Orator, the De Oratore, and the Topica. The sequence of development is fortuitous and even implausible, for the treatment of rhetoric becomes more perfunctory as erudition in the works of rhetoricians increases, and rhetoric disappears abruptly when knowledge of it is at a maximum, particularly from the works of the authors who acknowledge the influence of Cicero and Quintilian. The 1 By way of experimental departure from the customary procedure at meetings of learned societies the following paper will be the subject of discussion at the next meeting of the Mediaeval Academy on April 24, 1942. Rhetoric was chosen as a topic which impinges on many fields of mediaeval study, and an effort is made in the paper to touch, at least, on as many of them as possible. The paper will not be read at the meeting but will be considered in informal panel discussion in which it is hoped all members present at the meeting will participate.
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Rhetoric in the Middle Ages I Three distinct lines of intellectual development during the Middle Ages were decisively determined or strongly influenced in their initial stages by rhetoric: first, and most properly, the tradition of rhetoricians themselves who found their problems assembled and typical answers discussed in the works of Cicero and Quintilian; second, and less obviously, the tradition of philosophers and theologians who found in Augustine a Platonism reconstructed from the Academic and Neoplatonic philosophies (conscientiously reversing the process by which they were derived from Plato's doctrines) and formulated in terms refurbished and simplified from Cicero's rhetorical distinctions; and finally, the tradition of logic which passed as 'Aristotelian' yet which followed Aristotle only in the treatment of terms and propositions, and Cicero in the treatment of definitions and principles. Whatever the estimate critics and historians are disposed to make of Cicero's achievement, originality, and consistency, his choices and emphases fixed the influence and oriented the interpretation of ancient thought, Greek as well as Latin, at the beginning of the Middle Ages and again in the Renaissance, and we today are far from having freed ourselves from the consequences of that long tradition in scholarship, criticism, or taste. During the Middle Ages and Renaissance many of the oppositions and agreements of theology and dialectic, no less than problems internal to each, are stated in language borrowed from or influenced by rhetoric, and reflect theories by which rhetoricians had in antiquity opposed philosophers and logicians; surprising parallels arise in them as well as in other arts and sciences, expressed in language familiar to the rhetorician; innovations and discoveries are made which seem to follow the dictation of nature if their pattern of statement is ignored; and mere equivocations are pursued into interminable and recurrent verbal disputes.
The rhetoricians of the Middle Ages followed Cicero or suggestions found in his works when they discussed civil philosophy as the subject matter of rhetoric, or divided that subject matter according to the three kinds of oratory -deliberative, judicial, demonstrative -or when they sought to determine it more generally by means of the distinction between propositum and causa (or thesis and hypothesis as the Greek terms were Latinized), or by consideration of the characteristics of controversies and the constitutions (or status) of questions.' Moreover, they could learn, even from the De Inventione, that there had been controversy on most of these points, and in particular the brief history of three views concerning the matter of rhetoric -Gorgias holding that it is all things, Aristotle dividing it into three kinds proper to the three kinds of oratory, and Hermagoras distinguishing causes, which are specific to persons, and questions, which are without such specification -supplied the arguments by which to dissent from, as well as those to support, Cicero's version of Artistotle's solution.2 Major altera-tions in the contents and doctrines of rhetoric follow on these differences in matter particularly when they are joined to a little erudition, such as might be derived from study of the points of difference between the Ad Herennium and the De Inventione, or from the information supplied by Fortunatianus, concerning figures and the Greek technical terms of rhetoric, or finally from Quintilian's orderly enumerations of divergent views and his statement and rectification of inconsistencies attributed to Cicero.1 Even apart from the influence of theology, and before the influence of dialectic was felt, the remnants of controversial differences were preserved in rhetoric itself.
The influence of rhetoric on Augustine was by reaction and assimilation; he differentiated two eloquences and two arts, much as Plato had proved rhetoric to be a pseudo art in the Gorgias and yet had illustrated the method of the true rhetoric based on dialectic in the Phaedrus. Augustine was first attracted to philosophy by Cicero's Hortensius which he encountered in the course of his rhetorical studies, and he was put off in his further attempt to combine philosophy with the name of Christ by the contrast of the Scriptural and Ciceronian styles.2 That stumbling block was finally removed in part by the aid of a rhetorical device which he learned from Ambrose's preaching -the analogical method of interpreting Scripture3 -and although thereafter he refused to answer questions concerning Cicero's Orator and De Oratore, on the grounds that it was a task unworthy of a bishop distracted with ecclesiastical cares,4 his statement of Christian doctrine was in the terms of Cicero sublimated to new meanings and transformed to new uses. When he wishes to enumerate the questions basic to all inquiry, he resorts to Cicero's three 'constitutions of causes' -whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort; and when he enumerates the methods to be used in treating Scriptural questions, they turn out to be two of Cicero's five parts of rhetoric -discovery and statement; moreover, these two sets of questions seem to him exhaustive and all problems and doctrines turn, as in the manuals 6 controllable influence on our thought except by the context of other words, and the internal words by which a master speaking within us teaches the truth.1 Whether things be treated as signs or signs as things, only the eternal meanings and realities are important; knowledge of temporal things and of the arts is chiefly useful for the interpretation of the language and symbolism of Scripture, and the sacraments are signs adapted to the mutability of human sensibilities but immutable in their significance of the changeless things of God.2 Once account is taken of the distinction of things and words into those which are temporal and those which are changeless, the influence of rhetoric is discernible in many traits of the Augustinian tradition: in the analogical interpretation of Scripture and in the numerous mediaeval encyclopedias prepared to facilitate such interpretation (for words are signs which are useful less to designate things than to express truths and persuade minds, and things therefore are useful to interpret signs, not signs to interpret things);3 in the literal interpretation in which apparently contradictory texts were reconciled in canon law and theology by use of the rhetorician's 'circumstances' of statement, that is, by consideration of 'who' said it, 'where, when, why, how, with what assistance';4 in the organization of theological problems according to the distinction of things and signs; and in the place of rhetoric after dialectic in the enumeration of the liberal arts (since it supplies the means of stating truths once they have been discovered) instead of before dialectic as in the enumeration of an opposed tradition (since it achieves only probability and persuasion, but falls short of truth).5 The discussion of logic during the Middle Ages may be divided into four periods: during the first period the elements of logic were learned from simple Rhetoric in the Middle Ages treatises like the pseudo-Augustine's Principia Dialecticae and Categoriae Decem (which Alcuin recommended to Charlemagne as Augustine's translation of Aristotle's Categories) or the sections on dialectic in such handbooks as those of Martianus Capella, Cassiodorus, and Isidore of Seville; during the second period, after the curriculum instituted by Gerbert at the end of the tenth century, the basis of instruction in dialectic was broadened to include the works and translations of Boethius, among them two of the six books of Aristotle's Organon, which together acquired the traditional name of the Old Logic; during the third period, the translation of the remaining four books in the twelfth century set up the New Logic, constituted of the Introduction of Porphyry, the Organon of Aristotle, and the Six Principles of Gilbert de la Porree, yet the authority of the Old Logic continued strong, for the contemporaries of John of Salisbury found the Posterior Analytics, which treats of the principles of scientific demonstration, difficult or even unintelligible,' and indeed the first important commentary on that work was written in the thirteenth century by Robert Grosseteste, while as late as the fourteenth century William of Ockham prepared an Expositio aurea et admodum utilis super Artem Veterem; and finally during the fourth period, the discussion of logic is determined less by Aristotle's Organon than by the Summulae written in the thirteenth century by Petrus Hispanus, Lambert of Auxerre, and William of Shyreswood. The extent of the influence of rhetoric on the development of logic may be judged from the fact that -although Aristotle's logic is characterized not merely by the schemata of terms, propositions, and syllogisms set forth in the first three books of the Organon, but even more by the differentiation of proof, in accordance with the principles on which it depends, into three kinds: scientific or demonstrative, dialectical, and sophistical, which are expounded in the last three books, the Posterior Analytics, the Topics, and the De Sophisticis Elenchis -only the first three books had much influence until the thirteenth century, while principles were treated by devices which Aristotle used in rhetoric and dialectic, and even after the thirteenth century scientific method was in constant danger of being assimilated to dialectic, the Posterior Analytics to the Topics.
The early treatments of dialectic in the handbooks and encyclopedias run through a familiar sequence of subjects: the predicables of Porphyry, the categories of Aristotle, a briefer treatment of propositions in which the testimony of Aristotle's De Interpretatione is mixed in small doses with that of the treatise by the same name attributed to Apuleius, an exposition of the categorical syllogism derived from the pseudo-Apuleius and of the hypothetical syllogism derived from the rhetorician Marius Victorinus, and finally, in place of Aristotle's principles of demonstration, sections on definition and on 'topics' or 'common- Finally, instead of a treatment of the differences of demonstrative, dialectical, and sophistical principles and proofs, Boethius left two works which had the effect, during the Middle Ages and increasingly during the Renaissance, of translating the problem of distinguishing principles into the problem of discovering arguments or things: his Commentary on the Topics of Cicero and his treatise in four books On Topical Differences, in which the topical schemes or common-places of Themistius and Cicero are set forth and reduced to a single classification.3 With the advent of the New Logic in the third period, during the twelfth century, however, logic was distinguished from dialectic, and rhetoric became the counterpart of dialectic, although logic continued to be divided into judgment and discovery. Finally, during the fourth period, in the Summulae of the thirteenth century, the emphasis is again on the topics, as it is also in the reaction against logic during the Renaissance, when the Topics of Cicero and of Boethius were once more used (as John the Scot had used topics) as inspiration for a scientific method of discovering, not arguments, but things, and the scholastic logic was viewed as a verbal discipline inferior in precision and practical effectiveness to these devices of rhetoric.
The treatment of rhetoric, in turn, showed the effects of this extension of the devices of rhetoric to logic, since it became important to contrast rhetoric and dialectic when both rhetoricians and dialecticians made use of 'places' for purposes of discovery. Paradoxically, in this tradition in which the methods of rhetoric were similar to those of dialectic, rhetoric was subordinated to dialectic, while in the tradition in which rhetoric was criticized and then transformed to theological uses, dialectic was subordinated to rhetoric. The fourth book of Boethius' On Topical Differences, which treats of the differences between dialectical and rhetorical places, was used as a textbook of rhetoric in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and two short treatises devoted to rhetorical places passed under his name, the Speculatio de Rhetoricae Cognatione (which is more probably a compilation derived from Book IV of De Differentiis Topicis than an independent work by Boethius) and the Locorum Rhetoricorum Distinctio. Boethius finds the distinction between dialectic and rhetoric in their matter, use, and end: the matter of dialectic is 'theses,' that of rhetoric 'hypotheses,' and thesis and hypothesis are related as two kinds of 'questions,' the one universal, the other 
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Rhetoric in the Middle Ages particularized to circumstances; dialectic uses interrogation and response, and its arguments are set forth in syllogisms, rhetoric uses continuous speech involving enthymemes; the end of dialectic is to force what one wishes from an adversary, that of rhetoric to persuade a judge.' Boethius takes over the early position of Cicero, as expressed in the De Inventione, concerning matter, but the whole question of end, function, and matter is raised in the context of a considerably longer list of questions and in that context the other answers have changed. Boethius asks no fewer than nine questions about rhetoric: its genus, species, matter, parts, instrument, the parts of the instrument, the work and duty of the orator and his end. The genus of rhetoric is no longer 'civil science' (as it was for Cicero) but 'faculty' (much as Aristotle had held it to be a bivaC,uL rather than a science). The matter of the faculty is all things suited to discourse, which, as Boethius puts it, is almost equivalent to the 'civil question'; this matter of discourse is indeterminate until it is given specific form by the ends of rhetoric: the 'civil question' is made into a judicial 'cause' when the end considered is the just; into a deliberative 'cause' when the end is the useful or the honorable; into a demonstrative 'cause' when the end is the good. It is, as Isidore later observed, an elusive question, in which the genus of an art can be transmuted into its matter, but that strange difference is one of the slight remnants of the difference between Aristotle's conception of rhetoric and that of Cicero and the rhetoricians, and from that remnant in Boethius' questions, mediaeval commentators were to reconstruct, with slowly increasing erudition, the full specifications of the old opposition.
II
These were not technical questions which were discussed by a few learned men, but distinctions which entered into all parts of mediaeval culture and life. Christianity had grown up in the environment of a culture which was preponderantly rhetorical: indeed the chief differences between Greek and Latin Christianity may be derived from the difference between the Latin rhetoric of the Republic and early Empire (in which the arts and sciences had been put to the aid of rhetoric and civil philosophy had all but been reduced to the art of forensic pleading) and the Greek rhetoric of the Empire (in which philosophy itself had been displaced by display or epideictic rhetoric in the guise of sophistic, the rules of oratory had become the canons of literature, and Plato's and Aristotle's comparison of rhetoric and medicine had been made into a scientific method which rhetoric shared with medicine).2 Since many of the early converts who first wrote on Christian doctrine had been professional rhetoricians before their conversions,1 the rhetorical distinctions which they used in the statement of their problems and the organization of their works emerged often as doctrinal differences and empirical observations in later speculation on their statements. This emergence of rhetoric in the materials of discussion in all fields brought new questions into the technical disputes of the art. The numerous technical distinctions which had entered the apparatus and discussion of rhetoric took on applications, which echo or anticipate many of the positions of philosophers, proper to each of the three conceptions of rhetoric distinguishable in threefold opposition in the shifting materials to which rhetoric is applied.
Until the coming of the New Logic in the twelfth century the pattern of that opposition is relatively simple: the rhetorician who professed to treat of subject matters accessible to the 'common notions' of the mind without need of technical competence, found himself opposed on the one hand by theologians who had learned from Augustine to use the distinction between words and things both to attack the rhetoric of the schools and to practise a rhetoric concerned with divine eloquence and divine things, and on the other hand by rhetoricians who had learned from Boethius to use the distinction between thesis and hypothesis to limit rhetoric to probable reasoning concerning specifically delimited questions subordinate to the general questions of dialectic. To the Augustinian the excessive use or extension of rhetoric no less than that of dialectic was suspect; to the peripatetic follower of Boethius limitation or criticism of dialectic, whether from the point of view of theology or of rhetoric, was an attack on the use of reason; and to the rhetorician as such, limitation of rhetoric by the laws of logic or theolPhilostratus includes in his Lives of the Sophists some of the ancient philosophers who approximated the rhetorical style of the sophists, but he distinguished philosophy from sophistic (i. 481) since philosophers merely set snares for knowledge by their questioning, but asserted that they had no sure knowledge, whereas sophists of the old school professed knowledge of that whereof they spoke. Rhetoric in the Middle Ages 13 ogy was unwarranted restriction of the scope of reason and visionary neglect of the practical exigencies of the problems of law and morals. The simple lines of this opposition appear even in the early discussions of rhetoric, and they are preserved after the appearance of the New Logic, beneath the surface of the more intricate distinctions made necessary by the Aristotelian differentiation of logic from dialectic, poetic, sophistic, and rhetoric. These three main positions, taken throughout the Middle Ages with respect to rhetoric, may be marked off into four historical stages sharply distinguished by the authorities on which the discussion of the arts was successively based: a first stage extending to about the end of the tenth century when the chief authorities were the pseudo-Augustine, Martianus Capella, Cassiodorus, and Isidore; a second period extending through the eleventh and the first half of the twelfth century dominated by Cicero, Boethius, and the Old Logic; a third period comprising the latter part of the twelfth century and the greater part of the thirteenth century in which the New Logic became to some degree effective and was applied after a manner in the interpretation of the Aristotelian corpus; and finally the fourteenth century and the Renaissance in which Aristotle and the Greek rhetoricians, Cicero, Quintilian, and Boethius all had increasing influence. During the first period rhetoric was concerned -on the authority of Hermagoras, Cicero and Boethius, Fortunatianus, Augustine and Victorinus, and all the even more derivative authorities that depended on them -with civil philosophy.' According to Cassiodorus, 'The art of rhetoric is, as the masters of secular letters teach, the science of speaking well in civil questions,' and that definition is repeated in almost the same words by Isidore, Alcuin, and Rhabanus Maurus.2 The occasion of the dialogue with Charlemagne in which Alcuin's doctrine is stated is a request made by the emperor for information concerning the art, since he thinks it ridiculous for one whose daily occupation is with civil questions to be ignorant of the precepts of the art; the dialogue, moreover, is frankly moral not only in its traditional title, On Rhetoric and the Virtues, but in purpose, since the transition from rhetoric to the virtues is accomplished by recognition that this 'sermocinandi ratio' which is applied to civil cases and secular business must be supplemented by the other virtues. Yet within this broad agreement among rhetoricians that rhetoric is concerned with civil questions, there are numerous differences of statement, which sometimes lead to changes in the devices thought proper to rhetoric and which seem often to entail major philosophic differences. The chief of these is the difference between the position (which seems to go back to Hermagoras and for which Fortunatianus is sometimes given as authority) which treats civil philosophy in terms of the 'common notions' of mankind and therefore undertakes to differentiate the subject matter of rhetoric in terms of the questions treated, that is, the kinds of theses and hypotheses, and the position (which goes back to Cicero) which finds the subject matter of rhetoric in the three genera, deliberative, demonstrative, and judicial. The former has the effect of emphasizing the common bases of rhetoric in human knowledge while turning analyses to the peculiarities of the questions that can be asked, the other the effect of centering on the common qualities of the subject matter and directing inquiry to the peculiarities and virtues of the orator. The problems of rhetoric arise largely in the mixtures of the two traditions. Cassiodorus, citing Fortunatianus, defines civil questions as those which fall within the common conception of the mind, that is, which any one can understand when it is a question of the equitable and the good; Sulpitius Victor as those which are proper to no art but common to the opinion of all; Alcuin as those learned questions which can be conceived by the natural power of the mind.' Victorinus on the other hand divides the possible matter of rhetoric into two kinds: that with which the art operates (ubi fit), namely deliberative, demonstrative, judicial, and that from which the art is formed (unde fit), namely, the arguments which contribute the matter of those three kinds, then limits the consideration of rhetoric to the former, and refutes Hermagoras' doctrine of thesis and hypothesis in favor of the Aristotelian and Ciceronian doctrine of the three genera.2 Martianus Capella repeats this differentiation of two kinds of matter but goes on to the exposition of theses and hypotheses, confining his disapproval to a remark concerning the extremely subtle reasons of some of the sectaries of rhetoric who hold that all rhetorical questions are general or theses.3 The difference is between a tendency to make distinctions in terms of a subject matter and arguments suited to it and a tendency to make distinctions, often indeed the same distinctions, in terms of the orator and his problems of discovering and stating arguments. The former emphasis tends to intellectualize the art and change its orientation to a subject matter and its peculiarities into problems of inquiry and understanding, as when Sulpitius Victor, having limited rhetoric to the civil question and having divided the civil question into two parts, thesis and hypothesis, finds three duties for the orator: understanding, discovery, and disposition (the first of which was neglected by Cicero, but adequately treated by the Greeks) and then three genera of causes in the place of those long customary: the ethical, pathetic, and judicial. The latter emphasis leads to a series of questions, which were much discussed during the 14 Rhetoric in the Middle Ages
Philostratus' enthusiastic account of the sophists of the Empire is vivid indication of the spread and importance of epideictic rhetoric; its influence is likewise to be remarked in the Eastern
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Middle Ages, concerning the relation of morals and eloquence, concerning the relation of art and wisdom, concerning the definition of rhetoric as a virtue or an art or a discipline.l Rhetoric was to come into conflict with dialectic as a consequence of this tendency, as it was to come into conflict with theology as a consequence of its tendency to annex the problems of morals and the interpretation of Scripture. Since its discipline was gradually limited by the transfer of the commonplaces, definition, and finally proof -even in the rhetorical formulations they had received from Cicero, Victorinus, and Boethius -to the domain of dialectic, and since its subject matter was limited by the transfer of moral and political questions to theology, rhetoric entered into a second period during which it developed along three separate lines: as a part of logic, or as the art of stating truths certified by theology, or as a simple art of words.
III
The subordination of rhetoric to logic was accomplished usually in terms of the greater particularity of its subject matter, its concern with hypotheses rather than theses; and the terms of the discussion of the relation of rhetoric to dialectic were borrowed from Boethius. The doctrine is expressed, however, before the appearance of Boethius in the curriculum of the schools. According to Isidore of Seville, logic (Isidore adds that the Greek term X6'yos means 'rational') has two parts, dialectic and rhetoric.2 John the Scot omits grammar and rhetoric from his treatise On the Division of Nature first because many philosophers think they are parts of dialectic, second from considerations of brevity, and finally because, unlike dialectic, grammar and rhetoric do not treat of the nature of things but either of words significant by convention or of special causes and persons. the classification of rhetoric, for whereas Thierry would have it a part of civil science and not a part of logic, Gundissalinus classifies both rhetoric and poetic among the eight parts of logic, but he also classifies rhetoric and poetic as parts of civil science. ' Hugh of St Victor, who was contemporary with Thierry of Chartres, follows the suggestion of the Aristotelian division of the sciences into theoretic, practical, and mechanical (which seems to be Hugh's substitute for Aristotle's productive science): logic is a fourth branch and not a part of politics, which falls under the practical sciences. Moreover, his classification of logic makes an excellent transition from the customary classification according to the trivium of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic to the 'Aristotelian' classification as parts of logic and according to the kinds of proof. Following Isidore of Seville, Hugh points out the double etymology of X6yos, i.e., sermo and ratio, and argues that logic can be called either a verbal or a rational science (sermocinalis sive rationalis scientia); rational logic (which Hugh also calls dissertiva) is divided into dialectic and rhetoric, while verbal logic is the genus of grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric, and therefore rational logic is contained under it.2 This treatment of the traditional trivium is supplemented, however, by another division of logic into grammar and ratio disserendi or 'dissertive' logic, which is concerned with words as understood (de vocibus secundum intellectus). 'Dissertive' or rational logic is in turn divided into integral parts, i.e., parts shared by its kinds, which turn out to be the Ciceronian distinction into discovery and judgment, and divisive parts: demonstrative, probable, and sophistic; the two parts of probable proof are dialectic and rhetoric.3 John of Salisbury, one of the pupils of Thierry of Chartres, who had studied the whole of Aristotle's Organon and who was widely read in Cicero and Quintilian, attributes to Plato the division of logic into dialectic and rhetoric, but prefers, as more philosophic, the division into demonstrative, probable, and sophistic, with the further division of probable into dialectic and rhetoric. 
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R~Rhetoric in the Middle Ages on Romans, which is grammatical and rhetorical; but the texts such as those assembled there serve him as a store house of quotations for his systematic works, the Theologia 'Summi Boni,' the Theologia Christiana, and the Introductio ad Theologiam, in which the method which Abailard calls dialectical is used to resolve their differences, not by consideration of contexts and circumstances, but by reduction to an orderly body of true propositions. The difference, far from being slight, was to grow into one of the marks of differentiation between the line of Christian theology which adapted itself to the Aristotelian philosophy and made use of logic and dialectic and the line of Christian theology and philosophy which continued the distinction of the trivium and subordinated dialectic to rhetoric. One of the numerous admirers of Abailard who tried to remove the taint of unorthodoxy from his doctrines made that readjustment by shifting the functions of the arts, assigning to grammar a concern with meanings, to dialectic the production of conviction, and to rhetoric finally the motivation of the will.' This is a doctrine, moreover, which need suffer no opprobrium because of its connection with Abailard, since the same domination of the trivium by rhetoric is expressed, partly in the same words, by Bernard Sylvester, the friend of Thierry of Chartres, in his commentary on Virgil's Aeneid, a context which seems safe from the danger of heresy. species, infuse light, and give virtue to the heart of the hearer).' Or again, the first vision of God, which is by natural intelligence, is divided into three rays, since the light which is the truth of the soul illuminates the truth of things, of signs, and of morals: the second irradiation of truth is divided into three parts: grammar, logic, and rhetoric.2 The consideration of general and special forms of argument in necessary matter as well as the consideration of 'topical places' (in which induction proceeds by probable rather than necessary arguments) and sophistical places falls within logic, while rhetoric is concerned once more with civil utility and is divided into demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial.3 Or again, the fifth gift of the Holy Spirit is science, comprising the three philosophic sciences (rational, natural, moral), in all of which, including rational philosophy or verbal science, Solomon was adept.4
It is in the platonizing Augustinian tradition, moreover, that music and poetry assume a broad sense and dominant importance: Roger Bacon assigns to music the function which Bonaventura ascribed to rhetoric, and then distinguishes both rhetoric and poetic into two kinds, a theoretic rhetoric and poetic (or rhetorica docens and poetica docens) which are parts of logic, and an applied rhetoric and poetic (or rhetorica utens and poetica utens) which are parts of moral philosophy.' The opposed tendencies which led to the dominance of rhetoric in the Augustinian tradition and to the importance of logical demonstration in the Thomist tradition are integral with the total complexions of the two theologies as evidenced in the conclusion of Bonaventura that theology is neither theoretic nor practical but an affective habit mid-way between theory and practice as opposed to the argument of Thomas that theology subsumes both theoretic and practical sciences and is itself more theoretic than practical.6 It is a distinction which later historians have treated crudely by trying to differentiate 'voluntarism' from 'rationalism.' This tradition of rhetoric took form, for the most part, not in controversy or theory but in a vast number of textbooks which grew in three distinct groups differentiated according to the subject matters once treated by rhetoric but now concerned with verbal forms employed in those three fields in lieu of direct treatment of subject matter. First, rhetoric had contributed to the method of studying law, but the substantive consideration of law had moved into theology and had taken with it most of the appurtenances which might have made the law a learned profession, leaving only the verbal rhetoric of the dictamen.2 Second, the art of preaching which had assumed in the Christian tradition an exhortative function approximating that of ancient deliberative oratory -once due allowance is ). Boncompagni professes in the prologue to the former work not to remember ever having read Cicero, but he adds that he never dissuaded anyone who wanted to read him; and in the latter work he gives three reasons why he undertook to find a new rhetoric after Cicero had compiled a rhetoric from the infinite precepts of rhetoricians: (1) according to Boethius the rhetoric edited by the ancients consists solely of precepts, without doctrine or utility, (2) students in civil and canon law would not get a solid foundation in the liberal arts, (3) Cicero's rhetoric is rendered void according to students of law because it is never read in 'ordinary' courses, but is run through and taught like a mechanical art by stealth; to these he adds a fourth: that Cicero was mistaken about the origin of the law. 
